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6.1 Summary of the findings
A well established notion in the social sciences is that people form relationships in their
social networks because this allows them to gain access to resources, beneficial outcomes,
and objectives that otherwise would require greater eﬀorts or would not even be attainable.
Social networks then play the role of promoting the goals which actors pursue. The
majority of past research has studied the formation of social relationships considering
that actors are identical (homogeneous) in terms of abilities or preferences about their
behaviors, and thus in terms of the benefits associated with their alternatives. While
clearly unrealistic, the homogeneity assumption was used with the aim of investigating to
what extent individual diﬀerences can be explained as the result of a social process, without
assuming diﬀerences a priori. However, it is increasingly recognized that actors interacting
in social networks diﬀer in relevant characteristics, which can often influence the resulting
pattern of relationships they establish and the particular way in which relationships take
place.
Thus, the question of how individual diﬀerences between the actors influence their choices
becomes salient. It is likely that individual decisions about relationships and behavior
lead to selective choices about interaction partners, given who they are, resulting in the
inclusion of some actors and the exclusion of others. Furthermore, it is likely that pat-
terns of inclusion and exclusion in the relationships that take place in a social network
result in diﬀerentiated access to benefits and opportunities, leading to inequality in the
benefits that the included actors have compared to the benefits accrued by the excluded
actors. In accordance, this dissertation has studied the emergence of patterns of relation-
ships, exclusion, and unequal opportunities to access benefits, as a consequence of the
micro-processes between heterogeneous actors, by addressing the conditions under which
diﬀerences in individuals characteristics between people lead to social exclusion.
We have focused on two types of settings in which individual diﬀerences play a fundamental
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role in the emergence of relational and behavioral patterns: productive exchanges and
coordination games. For each setting we have considered what the essential individual
characteristic is that can help explain patterns of relationships and motivate choices of
inclusion/exclusion between actors. Our work on productive exchange, for instance, is
concerned with individual diﬀerences that are relevant for knowledge-intensive production.
Therefore, we have studied how diﬀerences in the productive capacities of the actors
influence their choices and the pattern of relationships that come about from them. In
our work on coordination games, where actors aim to coordinate with others in their
choice, we have focused on diﬀerences in the individual preferences actors have for one
choice or the other. In this way, we have focused on cases of conflicting preferences where
actors want to choose alike with those around them but they diﬀer on which is the best
choice to coordinate on.
In both settings the choices actors make imply the natural constraint that resources and
opportunities are scarce. In productive exchange, if an actor uses her resources with a
partner, she cannot use them with someone else simultaneously. In coordination games,
if an actor is choosing a convention to coordinate with some of her friends, she cannot
simultaneously choose a diﬀerent convention to coordinate with others. The result is that
some actors will be excluded by others. We have particularly studied these choices in the
two settings mentioned above. In the following sections we discuss the main results of our
studies.
6.1.1 Results on productive exchange networks
The studies on productive exchange networks in this dissertation are based on the prob-
lem of how do people form collaborative relationships when they diﬀer in the way they
can influence the achievable outcomes. To do so, we have used a common game theoretic
setting in which individuals choose their partners and their level of involvement in each
relationship by allocating their resources between them. We have studied two particu-
lar problems in productive exchange networks, always within the general domain of this
dissertation in which we want to understand if individual diﬀerences between people can
aﬀect the individual choices and lead to patterns of exclusion.
Our first problem addressed theoretically how and under what conditions social exclu-
sion arises in knowledge-intensive collaboration, modeled as productive exchange between
strategically interacting individuals. As argued by social exchange theory, collaboration
(i.e. productive exchange) is a fundamental aspect of social and economic life (Molm,
1994a, 1997). Collaborations are conceptualized as productive exchanges that improve
the welfare of all participants involved. However, on the downside, productive exchange
can also result in social exclusion, when actors have the freedom to select their relation-
ships from a pool of heterogeneous potential partners. A key innovation of our model is
the distinction of two types of expertise in knowledge-intensive production, generalist and
specialist expertise, from which we have been able to contribute to the research program
on how inequality results from diﬀerences at the individual level.
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The results of our model point to the individual expertise as an antecedent of actors’
incentives to form more or less collaborations. The more generalists there are, the more
projects are formed but the less resources are invested in each. Moreover, if actors are
free to rearrange their connections if a more profitable option is available, there will be
segregation between types of expertise. The specialists exclude the generalists from the
exchange even though the generalists are interested in collaborating with them. Therefore,
those who need collaboration the most, to be optimally productive, are least likely to be
included in collaborative exchanges.
In this sense, our first study has shown theoretically that heterogeneity in expertise can
breed social exclusion and inequality in productive exchanges. This is a very important
complement to the literature on social exchange, especially works addressing structural
diﬀerences as determinants of inequality, such as the position of an actor in the social net-
work. Specifically, our study provides antecedents to the structural approach by tackling
the problem of how the network of relationships comes about and how likely it is that
some actors result in certain position given who they are.
Our second problem on productive exchange uses the same setup in which actors with
diﬀerent productive capacities form collaborative relationships between them. In this
case, the chapter is a behavioral game theoretic experiment where we ask how the severity
of the coordination problem actors face (with whom to relate and how) can reduce the
sustainability of the relationships along time. This is a problem where exclusion and
inequality are also seen as part of a process that goes between periods of time and not
only in an isolated, one-shot case, such as in the previous problem. To address this
question we designed an experiment that varies, in three treatments, the way actors can
solve a severe coordination problem. Thus, we show experimentally how the severity of
the problem, which results from the heterogeneity in the individual characteristics of the
actors, can lead to exclusion in productive exchanges networks.
The results of our experiment suggest that the number of potentially stable outcomes in
the network does not aﬀect the likelihood of reaching them. Specifically, if there are less
Nash equilibria in one network and more in the other, there is not evidence that the one
with less equilibria will lead to more stability in the collaborative relationships than the
one with more equilibria. However, the existence of outcomes in which pairs of actors
find no incentives to change how they behave can ensure stable configurations; suggesting
that individual rationality is not enough, and dyadic rationality is also necessary to reach
stability. In addition, because not all networks have equilibria that holds also for dyadic
rationality (i.e. equilibria in the core) we have analyzed a diﬀerent notion of stability
where relationships are sustained along time, even if actors’ choices to respond to the
behavior of others are not necessarily best responses.
Generally in all experimental conditions subjects use reciprocity as the criteria to sustain
their exchange relationships. Thus, networks evolve by means of a reciprocal behavior in
which actors are likely to maintain and reinforce relationships along time. The mainte-
nance of these relationships leads to the exclusion of those partners that are not recipro-
cating to the allocations they receive (i.e. allocations to a combined project). Moreover,
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in cases where there are no equilibria in the core, reciprocity serves as a mechanism that
leads subjects to stable, sustainable, relationships even outside of equilibrium.
In this sense, our second study shows experimentally that there are valuable mechanisms,
such as reciprocity, which help actors achieve stability in their relationships and sustain
their collaborative exchanges. Reciprocity helps actors reach equilibrium outcomes in
cases where there are equilibria stable to dyadic improvements. In other cases, reciprocity
can help actors reach stable relationships outside of equilibria. Thus, the severity of the
coordination problem reduces the sustainability of relationships if that severity is measured
by the existence of equilibria in the core, but the sustainability of relationships can be
nonetheless observed if subjects chose to reciprocate to their partners’ behavior along time,
outside of equilibrium.
6.1.2 Results on coordination games on networks
The studies on coordination games in networks are based on the problem of what types
of networks of relationships and patterns of behavior result from the choices actors make
when there are conflicting preferences between them. To do so, we have used a common
setting in which individuals choose a convention (i.e. a social setting) and they gain benefit
by choosing alike with those around them. We have studied two particular problems in
coordination games on networks, where actors have diﬀerent preferences on the conventions
they would rather coordinate on, given they earn benefits depending not only on how many
others they coordinate with, but also on which choice they coordinate on.
Our first study on coordination provides a theoretical model in which actors are consid-
ered to have diﬀerent individual preferences, and their preferences are based on the gains
they get for coordinating on a specific choice. In many social and economic situations,
actors pursue coordination (or anti-coordination) with their neighbors in a network, but
also have intrinsic preferences among the available options. Here we introduce a model,
which allows us to analyze this issue by means of a simple framework in which players
endowed with an idiosyncratic identity interact in a social network. Actors have individual
preferences for a specific behavior given what is prescribed by their identity. In addition,
the complementarities exerted from coordinating with others, make it profitable in some
cases for actors to choose the option they prefer less and be compensated by the bene-
fits they gain through coordinating with others. This conflict in preferences can naturally
lead to inequality in the benefits actors gain from their choices given the interplay of social
influence (i.e. complementarities) and individual preferences.
The results of this theoretical study show that the choices actors make, given their pref-
erences and the choices of those around them, are determined by two thresholds. These
thresholds represent the number of neighbors they need to coordinate with in order to
choose what they like or what they dislike. Intuitively, these thresholds illustrate that
an actor requires less support from those around her to choose what she prefers, but
more pressure to choose the disliked option. As a consequence, the pressure exerted by
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the actor’s peers to influence her behavior is not the same when introducing individual
heterogeneity in the characteristics of the actors, compared to settings where actors are
homogeneous.
We defined the degree of heterogeneity as the proportion of actors, in the network, hav-
ing preferences for one action or the other. By means of this, we can better capture the
influence of heterogeneity on the micro-processes (i.e. behavioral patterns) that separate
or integrate neighbors depending on their choices. In cases where actors do not know the
preferences of those around them in the network (incomplete information), the model pro-
vides conditions for inequality in the benefit actors can achieve, given their own individual
preferences.
For high degrees of heterogeneity in the population, the predicted outcome is such that
every actor can choose her preferred action. Thus, the more heterogeneous the population,
the more likely actors find enough support to choose the action they like. However, if the
degree of heterogeneity is not so high that there is clearly a minority, actors in the minority
perceive greater pressure from those in the majority. In turn, all actors are more likely to
choose the behavior preferred by the majority, although for some this is not their preferred
behavior.
This first study has shown theoretically that heterogeneity in preferences can lead to ex-
clusion when the diﬀerent sets of actors are of a similar size, because neither can exert
enough influence on the other to make them choose diﬀerently to what they prefer. This
exclusion, recall, is expressed as the impossibility to interact and gain profit with those
choosing diﬀerently but only with those actors choosing the same social convention. How-
ever, if the sizes diﬀer so that a set of actors with a specific preference is a majority, the
majority exerts a stronger pressure on those actors in the minority. Thus, the pattern of
behaviors is such in which actors are choosing the same convention, although a portion
of the population is not choosing what they like but what is better for them given the
influence of those around them. These results complement the findings on coordination
games in homogeneous populations by showing how diﬀerences in individual preferences
can nonetheless result in outcomes where all actors choose the same behavior. Although
the existence of heterogeneity implies conflict, given that actors require more pressure to
coordinate with those who are diﬀerent from them and less influence to do so with those
who are alike, it is the level of heterogeneity that can actually lead to separation between
them.
Our second study examines the interplay between a person’s individual preference and
the social influence others exert, when they can to choose their neighbors in the network.
This is a natural extension of our first work on coordination games, where actors could
only choose how to behave but not their social network. Just as in our previous work, we
provide a model of network relationships with conflicting preferences, where individuals
are better oﬀ coordinating with those around them, but not all prefer the same action.
We tested our model through an experiment, varying the level of conflicting preferences
between individuals by varying the level of heterogeneity in the population. That is, in
some cases all actors have the same preference (no conflict in preferences) and in others
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there is heterogeneity so that a conflict arises. If there is a very large majority we denote
it as low conflict, and when the majority is almost as representative as the minority we
denote it as high conflict.
In this second study we proposed a model where actors can decide what relations to form
and what behavior to adopt, while in the model of the previous study we focused on be-
havior but actor’s relationships were given. By means of developing this theoretical model
and testing it through a laboratory experiment, we can address conditions for segregation
and inequality. Segregation emerges when actors, who can freely form relationships be-
tween them, choose to aﬃliate with a specific subgroup of the population, which can be
others who share their same preferences or others who chose their same behavior. There is
inequality in the way benefits are obtained in a relationship when actors coordinate on the
same choice but for some the choice is their preferred option, while for others the choice
is the disliked one.
The results of our experiment suggest that preferences are more salient than social in-
fluence. This means that even if subjects could achieve a greater benefit (i.e. monetary
earnings in the experiment) by aﬃliating with most others and coordinating with them on
one same action, their preference for a behavior inhibits this integration. Thus, in situa-
tions with conflicting preferences, where there is heterogeneity in the population of actors
regarding to their motivation to choose one action or another, subjects form relationships
mainly with others who share the same preference. This leads to two undesirable out-
comes: network segregation and social ineﬃciency. Network segregation results because
actors separate between those who like one action and those who like the other. Social
ineﬃciency results because in the aggregate, if all actors integrate and coordinate on one
same action, the complementarities of their interactions can be the highest but they are
more inclined to segregate. In this regard we find that the same force that helps people
individually reduces the total productivity of society in a great way.
6.2 A general comment on the findings and on further
research
In general, our findings show that heterogeneity, at first sight, appears as a clear de-
terminant of social exclusion and segregation. Regardless of whether we are addressing
problems of productive exchange or coordination games, the existence of individual diﬀer-
ences between the actors poses great coordination problems. Thus, there is diﬃculty for
the actors to find suitable exchange partners and interact with them, due to the threat
of coordination failures. In fact, failing to coordinate with a productive exchange partner
means loosing one’s resources. An actor could instead be better oﬀ if she had used her
resources in a collaboration with another partner. Thus, even when some potential part-
ners are more attractive than others one is better oﬀ coordinating with a less attractive
partner if the first one does not reciprocate to the relationship.
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In the same way, there are diﬃculties for actors to choose which behavior to adopt, espe-
cially if they have preferences for one choice but it appears that their benefits could be
greater if choosing a behavior they dislike. This can occur when most of one’s neighbors
prefer one’s disliked choice, for the coordination with a larger majority can give them
greater gains than choosing alike with a small minority. Therefore, as such, heterogeneity
poses diﬃculties in coordinating with others, which can determine social exclusion and
segregation between actors.
Nonetheless, when the micro-processes that lead to patterns of behavior and networks of
relationships at the macro level are studied in more detail, we can observe that this is not
always the case. Heterogeneity leads to greater complexity in the interactions, but there
are ways in which actors find coordination mechanisms even in complex settings. Thus,
achieving valuable outcomes by sorting out the coordination diﬃculties that heterogeneity
brings about. A first main aspect that helps actors not only coordinate with others but
also sustain their relationships is to have the freedom to choose their improvements as
a dyad. That is, actors can attempt to improve their well-being by unilaterally making
changes.
However, because there are diﬀerent potential partners around them, improving in one
case without others changing their behavior as well (i.e. their allocation of resources) leads
to outcomes where the focal actor improves but her partners are not necessarily better
oﬀ. In this sense, they will have incentives to change the way they use their resources
between relationships. This leads to better outcomes for them but not necessarily for
their partners. Nonetheless, a simple change in how actors choose their changes from
individual to dyadic deviations can greatly simplify their coordination problems. Pairs
of actors change together, and they can easily reach stable outcomes where relationships
are sustainable and great benefits are gained. This is a natural consequence, given that
relationships in our studies are focused on dyadic interactions. This implies that at the
dyadic level, if pairs of actors coordinate on their changes, say by means of reciprocating
to each other, their relationship will be sustained and stable along time. Furthermore, we
have empirically observed this is so even for cases where actors are not best responding to
the partners’ choices.
In other contexts, even when dyadic improvements are considered, say for instance in coor-
dination games, it is likely that segregation between actors takes place. Those who choose
one behavior will separate from those who choose the other behavior. As a consequence,
in the aggregate, the social welfare is reduced. However, even though heterogeneity in
preferences leads to conflict and segregation, having low levels of heterogeneity can result
in integration. If there us a large majority and a small minority, the former can exert
pressure on the latter and influence their behavior. In this sense, actors are better oﬀ inte-
grating and forming relationships with those around them regardless of their preferences.
If so, if they end up all choosing the behavior preferred by the majority.
Nonetheless, such an outcome was only observed as a theoretical finding. When the
empirical assessment was made, segregation was pervasive. Subjects used their individual
preference as a way of simplifying the coordination problem of choosing with whom to
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relate and how to behave. This helped them reduce coordination failure and improve their
gains in each period they interacted with others. However, the same force that facilitated
their relationships lead to segregation between those who preferred one choice and those
who preferred the other. It is likely that in cases where interactions allow for a natural
extension such as communication between the actors, the mechanism that can lead to
segregation, their individual characteristics, would not be the only force. Arguably, with
communication actors with conflicting preferences can reach agreements on how to behave.
This could lead to outcomes at the network level, where they can integrate and coordinate
on a common choice, improving their individual gains and the social welfare.
In what remains of this conclusion chapter we address some extensions for further research,
which can complement and extend the lines of research that have been studied in this
dissertation.
6.2.1 Theoretical extension: Behavioral rules
Schelling (1978) points to behavioral rules as some of the main elements interacting in social
games. That is, the choices actors can make and the order in which they can choose. This
is specifically important when the assumptions about actors’ decision-making (i.e. their
behavior) are derived from one theory of action or another, and when actors are assumed
to interact between them for single events (i.e. one shot-interactions) or for multiple
occasions (i.e. repeated interactions). Thus, our first extension points to the theoretical
approach on behavioral rules in our models. Particularly, our modeling on heterogeneity
has been derived from the other two elements interacting in the social game: who we are
(individual roles) and what we can do (result rules).
We developed a theoretical model for productive exchange in Chapter 2 and theoretical
models for coordination games in Chapters 4 and 5. These chapters share a common
approach in the way actors are modeled at the micro-level, for they are all based on the
same theory of action: rational choice theory. In particular, actors are assumed to play
a best response to the behavior of their partners. Thus, the allocation of resources for a
given productive exchange is optimal in relation to the allocation of resources made by
a partner. Similarly, an actor’s choice of behavior in a coordination game is optimal in
relation to the aggregation of choices of those around her in the network. Clearly, in both
cases, depending on the individual characteristics of the focal actor.
However, as suggested in the empirical findings of Chapter 3, actors do not always find it
easy to best respond to the behavior of those around them. In many cases, their behavior
is based on a less complex strategy: reciprocity. Thus, if we want to explain variations in
the way actors form and maintain relationships in social networks, we need to introduce
reciprocity as an essential part of an actors’ decision-making process.
Naturally, including reciprocity into the analysis requires that the interactions studied are
repeated along time, which is not the case of the theoretical models in this dissertation.
For this reason, a complementary extension is to model the influence reciprocity has on
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the decisions actors make by studying how behavior and the network of relationships co-
evolve along time. In principle, this could also inform us about situations of no repetition
as well as those of repeated interactions. This was not the focus of our work in this book.
The goal we pursue here is that of understanding the eﬀect of individual diﬀerences on
relationships, and to see whether individual diﬀerences can result in exclusion and inequal-
ity. Nonetheless, it would be desirable to be able to integrate the analysis of individual
diﬀerences between the actors in the co-evolution of networks and behavior.
6.2.2 Empirical extension: Communication
With the studies in Chapter 3 and 5, we aimed to contribute to the empirical validation
of the eﬀects of individual diﬀerences between the actors on patterns of exclusion and
inequalities between them. Laboratory experiments allow for controlled environments,
which help understand the eﬀect that particular variables have on behavior and emerging
network configurations. Naturally, empirical studies can only address so many consider-
ations of the theoretical predictions at a time. Consequently, much more empirical work
is needed with the aim of understanding heterogeneity and its eﬀects on inequality and
exclusion. Without systematic empirical tests of the implications of theoretical models, it
is diﬃcult to judge which assumptions might be problematic, and to decide on how future
theoretical research should be developed. Nonetheless, laboratory experiments can be in-
formed about limitations of the theoretical models through the findings of other laboratory
experiments, even if they were applied to diﬀerent social games, due to the consistent and
systematic way in which they are developed.
Within the so called experimental economics tradition of laboratory experiments, there
are specific protocols that permit regularities in the findings. For instance, subjects are
never deceived, they are always paid with monetary incentives for their outcomes in the
experiments, experimental outcomes depend strategically on the choices of the diﬀerent
subjects, and subjects do not know the identity of those they are interacting with in
the experiment; which controls for any type of influence that the relationship between
two subjects might bring. From this, we consider a main empirical extension needed in
experiments on heterogeneity in individual characteristics between actors interacting in
social networks: communication between actors when playing the games.
Communication is a fundamental aspect of human relationships. Furthermore, applied to
network relationships, the theoretical modeling of networks assumes that in cases of bilat-
eral deviations, actors have decided to simultaneously change their choices after talking
to each other. This means that even when it is not stated explicitly, in most network
interactions communication is implicitly assumed. Communication plays a determinant
role on actors’ decision making, even for cases in which agreements derived from the com-
munication between actors are not enforceable (i.e. non-binding agreements). Specifically,
communication between actors simplifies the coordination problem they face and reduces
the uncertainty about how potential partners will behave. This consequently leads to
greater benefits, and facilitates how actors achieve stable outcomes. The introduction of
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communication in our experimental work could influence actors by helping them achieve
more profitable outcomes, but could also bring a detrimental eﬀect on the abuse of power if
relationships are unequal. Thus, the eﬀect of including communication in our experimental
work is not straightforward. Next we discuss possible results.
In Chapter 3 we run a laboratory experiment to understand how actors solve the complex
coordination problem of choosing with whom they relate and how they allocate resources
among their diﬀerent relationships. Actors interact repeatedly with the same partners in
their group, which allows them to create stronger relationships between them. Particularly,
in such a detailed type of exchange where actors choose partners and specific amounts of
resources, communication can greatly help them make agreements. Thus, simplifying the
coordination problem. Moreover, pre-play communication, the possibility actors have of
talking to each other before making any decision in the game, has been shown to facilitate
coordination in Nash equilibrium outcomes (Farrell and Rabin, 1996). This suggests that
with regard to productive exchange networks, communication would help achieve stable
outcomes for the very complex cases in which there is a huge multiplicity of them.
Finally, applied to our main interest, the eﬀect that individual diﬀerences between actors
have on their network relations, communication could also play a detrimental role. If
actors perceive their individual characteristics to be influential on the choices of others,
communication can be a mechanism for the transmission of threats that can lead to unfair
exchanges between powerful actors and those who are more dependent on them. Commu-
nication can help transmit threats about how an actor would be willing to leave an existing
partner if the counterpart relates to others or reduces her involvement in their joint ex-
change. For instance, communication can allow specialized actors to make generalists
allocate more resources into a joint coproduction because the former are more attractive
partners and their bargaining power is greater. Thus, on one hand communication can
help simplify the complexity of coordination problems in productive exchange networks,
but on the other, it can bring about stronger patterns of inequalities and exclusion by
potentiating the strength that more attractive partners have upon the least attractive
ones.
Including communication in our laboratory experiment in Chapter 5 could also allow us to
better understand the complexity of the interplay between individual preferences and social
influence. On the one hand, if actors can express how willing they are to form relationships
with others, even if those others have diﬀerent identities, communication would help them
improve their well being and reduce coordination failures between them. Think about
the case of a large majority and a small minority (i.e. Low Conflict treatment). If the
3 subjects in the minority achieve connection and coordinate with the 12 subjects in the
majority, they would be better oﬀ than if segregated. In fact, in our experiment we
observed that subjects in the minority attempted to connect to the majority but failed.
This can be due to the lack of opportunities to communicate between them.
Thus, it is possible that in real life contexts the minority actors could have the opportunity
to express their desire to integrate with the majority. Even at the expense of sacrificing
their identities for the sake of the benefits that social relationships bring about. For
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instance, in the case of a large majority, if a member of the small minority achieves
coordination with the majority due to their communication channels, this actor would
immediately be better oﬀ than if she had stayed with her minority. The complementarities
of the group size could compensate for the loss in identity. However, for cases where the
minority and the majority are not too diﬀerent in size, the eﬀect of communication is not
clear, for it is not only the deviation of a small number of others that is needed but the
integration of a larger group. That is, a minority member is strictly better oﬀ switching
from her minority group, where she chooses her preferred behavior, to the majority group,
where she would choose the disliked behavior, if more of her minority partners were also
joining the larger majority. So that if only some but not all actors in the minority would
integrate into the majority to gain from the benefits of belonging to a larger group (i.e. a
larger coalition), those who are sacrificing their identity benefits might end up worse oﬀ
than before.
Thus, on the one hand, communication can help increase benefits for actors in small
minorities by allowing them to coordinate with a large majority. This is possible even if
the transition from one behavior to another would not be simultaneous for all actors in the
minority. But, on the other, communication can cause great losses for the minority if the
groups are of similar size, because the way the transition takes place matters a lot.
6.2.3 Concluding remarks
In this book we have studied how inequality can be the by-product of social exclusion as it
results from exchanges between heterogeneous individuals. A first general element to take
away from our four studies is that individual diﬀerences play a key role in understanding
individual choices and aggregate outcomes. Compared to situations where actors are
assumed identical, or where their individual characteristics are considered non relevant to
their interactions, our work has shown how influential characteristics such as expertise or
preferences are in shaping behavior. The second general element to draw from this set
of studies is that heterogeneity in individual diﬀerences is not in itself a determinant of
social exclusion. Even if actors diﬀer in very relevant characteristics, there are settings
where exclusion is not necessary. For instance, researchers with specialized expertise can
collaborate with others who have a diﬀerent type of expertise, such as the generalists.
In similar ways, individuals with conflicting preferences can choose alike and coordinate
in the products they purchase; because interacting and exchanging with others is very
valuable and can provide great benefit to actors.
The third general element to take away is that for some settings, nonetheless, social exclu-
sion is inevitable in the presence of heterogeneity in individual characteristics. Specifically,
settings in which actors have the possibility to readjust their interactions and their inter-
action partners. In these scenarios, where pairs of actors can redefine their relationships,
say by forming a relationship if they do not have one or severing the relationship if they
have it, rational actors will be motivated to improve their wellbeing by carefully selecting
particular relationships. This in turn excludes those others who cannot provide the most
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valuable outcomes.
